Editorial: Mental Healthcare through the Lens of Risk by Heyman, Bob
University of Huddersfield Repository
Heyman, Bob
Editorial: Mental Healthcare through the Lens of Risk
Original Citation
Heyman, Bob (2009) Editorial: Mental Healthcare through the Lens of Risk. Mental Health and 
Learning Disabilities Research and Practice, 6 (1). pp. 3-4. ISSN 1743-6885
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/12414/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
 
 
Mental Health and Learning Disabilities Research and Practice 
Volume 6 Number 1 April 2009 
Editorial 
Mental Healthcare through the Lens of Risk 
Risk has become a hot topic following the global financial meltdown which started 
in 2007 on account of the systematic failure of regulation which it exposed. It might 
be supposed that this fiasco will impact on mental health and learning disability 
services mainly through reducing the public finance available to a presently under­
resourced sector. However, the collapse of the banking system will also impact on 
risk itself, i.e. the way in which risks are viewed in the wider society. The validity of 
risk regulation will no longer be taken for granted. Financial regulatory systems 
failed because they managed reputational risk rather than the potential for 
disaster, a point made presciently by one social scientist (Power, 2007) before the 
financial collapse got under way. (Innumerable pundits have developed this 
argument with the benefit of hindsight.) Greater scepticism about the validity of 
regulation may affect risk management at many levels of the health service, 
including NHS Trusts and the Care Quality Commission which has recently 
replaced the Healthcare Commission. 
The influence of risk thinking on health service provision, for better and worse, 
hardly needs documenting. A historical shift towards this mode of thought has 
taken place over the last 20 years or so. It is illustrated by a comparison of the 
following two accounts of murders committed by discharged forensic mental health 
patients. The Butler Report (Home Office/Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1975) stimulated the eventual development of medium secure forensic 
mental health units in the UK. The report was produced in response to the case of 
Graham Young. Whilst confined to a high secure institution, he actively pursued 
his interest in poisoning, for which he had been incarcerated, for example 
borrowing numerous library books on the topic. After his release, he promptly 
resumed his career as a poisoner. This tragic but blackly comic example provides 
a striking example of risk blindness. Risk managers can only respond to 
contingencies which they think about. Physically and socially remote from wider 
society, staff working in high security institutions may become oriented towards 
internal risks such as patients harming themselves or others. However, Butler did 
not draw upon the language of risk. Instead he focused on the need to take 
forensic mental health services closer to the communities into which patients 
would eventually be discharged. 
The contrast with a more recent inquiry into a murder committed by a patient 
released from forensic mental health services is striking. 
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‘Too much confidence was placed in clinical judgements unsupported 
by evidence and rigorous analysis. Ways of working did not facilitate 
effective discussion and challenge of clinical views. There was a 
tendency to emphasise unduly the desirability of engaging John 
Barrett rather than intervening against his wishes to reduce risk.’ 
(South West London Strategic Health Authority, 2006, p.9) 
The thinking behind this later report centred on clear risk assessment and firm risk 
management. However, it is debatable whether ‘evidence and rigorous analysis’ 
are sufficiently robust to allow subsequent reoffending to be predicted with a 
clinically useful degree of accuracy. A report produced recently by Leeds 
Partnerships NHS Foundation Trust (Butler, 2008) draws a useful distinction 
between ‘outcome independent’ and ‘outcome contingent’ risks. The former mostly 
involve medical errors, for instance accidently giving patients a dangerous drug 
overdose. Ideally, such risks should be avoided entirely. Unfortunately, mistakes 
cannot be eliminated entirely from any complex, organised human activities. Risk 
minimisation is perhaps a more realistic goal. 
In contrast, taking outcome dependent risks confers benefits as well as costs. For 
example, a patient discharged from mental health services might commit suicide 
which could have been prevented if they had not been allowed to leave hospital. 
On the other hand, this patient might be kept expensively in hospital when they 
could have safely flourished outside. Such risks can only be managed through 
looking for an optimum balance between safety and autonomy (Heyman and 
Huckle, 1993; Heyman et al., 2004) and positive risk-taking (Titterton, 2005). Risk 
assessment should be as rigorous and interdisciplinary as possible. But the 
inherent difficulty of predicting how an individual might respond to a very different 
environment to that of the hospital in which they are being observed needs to be 
acknowledged. Health and social care providers are currently faced with managing 
these difficult issues in the knowledge that they risk being condemned by inquiries 
undertaken with the benefit of hindsight if their decisions result in adverse events. 
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